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ABSTRACT 
 
We explore a subtle but important mechanism through which firms can control information 
flow to the markets. We find that firms that “cast” their conference calls by 
disproportionately calling on bullish analysts tend to underperform in the future. Firms 
that call on more favorable analysts experience more negative future earnings surprises and 
more future earnings restatements. A long-short portfolio that exploits this differential firm 
behavior earns abnormal returns of up to 149 basis points per month, or almost 18 percent 
per year. We find similar evidence in an international sample of earnings call transcripts 
from the UK, Canada, France, and Japan. Firms with higher discretionary accruals, firms 
that barely meet/exceed earnings expectations, and firms (and their executives) that are 
about to issue equity, sell shares, and exercise options, are all significantly more likely to 
cast their earnings calls. 
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Regardless of the extent of disclosure regulation, there exists private information which 
managers can release at their discretion.  Given the current regulatory environment in the 
US of level playing-field information laws, firms are mandated to communicate material 
information in public information exchanges.  However, even in these highly regulated 
venues, there are choices that firms can make that reveal differential amounts of 
information to the market.   
 In this paper we explore a subtle but important mechanism through which firms can 
control information flow to the markets. The setting we exploit is the universe of regularly 
scheduled quarterly earnings calls.  Our empirical strategy is to examine firms’ decisions to 
“cast” their earnings conference calls in a particular way; specifically, how and who they 
call on to participate in these calls.  In particular, we show that firms tend to “cast” their 
conference calls by disproportionately calling on bullish analysts to speak during the Q&A 
session of these calls, a fact we document using a 13-year sample of US data, as well as in 
4 international markets.1  
    Using this fact as our starting point, we then provide novel evidence on the 
implications of this managerial tendency for both asset prices and future firm behavior.  
We focus on the firms that call specifically on analysts that have given them the highest 
recommendations (as proxied by the average recommendation over the past year), and test 
the idea that firms that cast their conference calls in this way may be preventing the 
revelation of negative information to the market.  Rather than focus on the impact on the 
sell-side analyst community of this type of managerial behavior—the focus of prior work in 
this area—our key contribution in this paper is to analyze the implications for future asset 
prices, along with future behavior and firm outcomes.  We find that the casting of 
conference calls has a large and predictable effect on future stock returns, both in the US 
and across broad international markets. 
 To better understand our approach, consider the case of Sealed Air Corp.  Sealed 
Air produces a variety of packaging materials, the most well-known of which is Bubble 
                                                 
1 This confirms prior evidence in the literature, namely Mayew (2008) and Mayew, Sharp, and Venkatachalam 
(2013), who establish this same pattern in a US sample of firms and calls from 2002-2005, and who explore 
the implications of differential analyst participation during conference calls for analyst accuracy. 
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Wrap.  Sealed Air held their Q1 earnings conference call in April 2007.  While Sealed Air 
was covered by 11 analysts, on this particular call, it only allowed a select few to participate 
in the conference call: those analysts that had particularly high recommendations on the 
firm in advance of the call.  These analysts largely complimented the firm on the quarter, 
but did not push them on the upcoming quarter.  Figure 1 shows excerpts from the 
conference call: Panels A-C show several cases in which the analysts can be seen joking and 
laughing with the CEO, with one analyst specifically complimenting the CEO on cash 
strategy. Throughout all of the exchanges there is a notable lack of difficult (or even 
substantive) questions posed by the analysts. 
 Three months later, at the Q2 earnings call following the April call where analysts 
with particularly positive recommendations were called upon, Sealed Air missed 
expectations, had their first negative free cash flow quarter (following 20 consecutive 
positive ones), and dropped 7% on the announcement.  In this paper we show that this 
pattern--of firms appearing to choreograph information exchanges directly prior to the 
revelation of negative news--is systematic across the universe of publicly traded firms. 
 More generally, our primary contribution is that there is a powerful asset pricing 
implication from this behavior. Namely, firms that manipulate their conference calls in this 
way appear to be hiding bad news, which ultimately leaks out in the future in terms of 
predictable future return dynamics and firm operating performance.  Specifically, we find 
that casting firms experience consistently predictable negative future returns.  A long-short 
portfolio that goes long the non-casting firms and short the casting firms around their 
subsequent call earns abnormal returns ranging from 129 basis points (t=2.59) to 149 basis 
points (t=2.64) per month; which translates to annualized abnormal returns of roughly 15 
to 18 percent per year. These returns are robust over time, alternative factor-model 
controls, and formation horizons.   
 Going further, using a hand-collected dataset of international earnings transcripts, 
we then show that the core evidence in this paper extends beyond the U.S., to an 
international sample including the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Japan.  
Specifically, we again find that an analyst’s prior recommendation level is a strong predictor 
of the likelihood of asking a question on an earnings call in each of these 4 additional 
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countries.  We then show that casting on an international earnings call predicts negative 
future announcement returns on the subsequent earnings event, consistent with our U.S. 
evidence.  Collectively, our evidence spans 5 countries, 13 years, 4101 firms, and 7125 
analysts, covering 91,878 conference calls in total, making our dataset the largest and most 
extensive of any project analyzing corporate earnings calls. 
 In terms of the magnitude and incidence of casting across the population of firms, 
we find that more “extreme” examples of casting—where the average gap in 
recommendation levels between the analysts who are called upon in a call and those who 
do not speak is largest (which we term (RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT))—are associated with 
the most negative future returns, suggesting that the tails of this gap distribution do 
capture true casting behavior by firms.  A one-standard deviation move above the zero 
recommendation-gap benchmark implies that between 17-22% of firms in a given quarter 
engage in this type of opportunistic behavior.  In the time-series we find that RECD(IN)-
RECD(OUT) is (on average) significantly higher in 2008 than in other years, consistent 
with the idea that casting behavior was more prevalent during the financial crisis. 
 We show that the predictability also relates to future firm operating performance – 
with firms that cast having significantly and predictability more negative future earnings 
surprises and negative returns surroundings those surprises.  Importantly, the return 
predictability that we document is not driven by well-known predictors of future returns 
such as analyst forecast dispersion, analyst recommendation dispersion, discretionary 
accruals, affiliation status, or issuance behavior.  Further, we observe no sign of any return 
reversal in the future, suggesting that the negative information that is hidden is information 
important for fundamental firm value.   
 We explore the mechanism behind the behavior by turning to the mechanics of the 
conference call itself. In particular, analysts face two choices: i.) whether or not to dial (or 
log) into a given call, and ii.) conditional on (i), whether or not to indicate that they’d like 
to ask a question.  The firm has a number of choices in the action space once announcing 
the time and call-in details:2 i.) How long to hold the conference call; ii.) how to split the 
                                                 
2 Though we’ll show that they can actually be selective on the latter of these in extreme cases, through the 
example of Colin Gillis from BGC Partners and Amazon. 
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time between initial management discussion and presentation and Q&A; iii.) of the analysts 
who have indicated they’d like to ask a question, decide how many of the analysts to call 
upon; iv.) decide exactly whom to call upon; and v.) in what order.  Our evidence, cast in 
the light of these firm decisions, is that the more positive analysts are called upon - and 
called upon significantly earlier in the conference Q&A – systematically (and directly) 
preceding periods of future negative price and firm operating performance realizations. This 
is consistent with firms actively using their ability during the calls to call upon more 
“friendly” analysts when they have more negative information to conceal.   However, it 
could be that the firm calling patterns we observe are coming through analysts’ portion of 
action space; namely, that optimistic analysts are the only analysts who choose to speak 
on an earnings call, and that firms are merely passive actors in this process.    
 In order to further explore this alternative story and shed more light on the precise 
mechanism, we conduct a collect new data, construct a number of new measures, and 
perform a number of analyses. First, we parse our entire dataset and manually examine 
each conference call transcript in order to identify all the calls where phrases such as “There 
are no more questions in the queue” are spoken by management or by a moderator at the 
very end of the call.  For these calls, management is ostensibly not casting the call, since 
for these calls management actively opens up the call to the entire audience until there are 
no other call participants desiring to ask a question.  We show that these calls are not 
accompanied by significantly negative returns in the future; meanwhile the negative future 
returns described earlier are concentrated only on the calls where this phrase does not 
occur, suggesting that only the casted calls drive our key results. 
 Second, we examine a number of instances in which firms might be expected to be 
particularly interested in concealing negative information ex-ante. For instance, firms that 
engage in more earnings management (discretionary accruals), may be especially wary of 
calling on analysts that will probe into these accruals.  Additionally, firms that barely meet 
or exceed earnings expectations (meeting at 0, or beating by 1 penny), have been shown in 
prior literature to be far more likely to have manipulated earnings in order to do so, and 
so may be less likely to want to be aggressively questioned.  Lastly, firms planning to do 
SEOs (or managers planning to sell their shares, or exercise their options) in the near future 
may be interested in keeping share price high to maximize proceeds, and so may prefer to 
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call on friendly analysts.  We find evidence on all three of these paths: firms with higher 
discretionary accruals, firms that barely meet/exceed earnings expectations, and firms (and 
their executives) about to issue equity, sell shares, and exercise stock options are all 
significantly more likely to call on analysts with more optimistic views of the firm. 
 Summing all of these results, our evidence is less consistent with a view that the 
patterns we document are driven solely from the analyst side, i.e., that optimistic analysts 
are the only analysts who choose to speak on an earnings call, and that firms are merely 
passive actors in this process.  First, the evidence on the timing of the behaviors above is 
hard to reconcile with this alternate view, since the analysts would have to choose to show 
up and speak only on the calls that exactly coincide with the firm- and manager-level 
opportunistic behaviors listed above, which seems implausible.  Added to the “no more 
questions” sample, and the results only being driven by the actively firm-“casted” 
conference calls, and the evidence seems to point more toward the firm being an important 
and active participant in the call patterns we document.   
 Lastly, we attempt to explore the dynamics of the sentiment of the analysts’ 
questions.  While this is a difficult task, we use a simple measure of how positive the tone 
of the question is (the number of positive vs. negative words).  In doing so, we find evidence 
that favorable analysts—i.e., those with higher outstanding recommendations—tend to ask 
more positive questions.  Moreover, the more positive of questions an analyst asks in a call, 
the more likely they are to be called upon again in future calls – with negative questions 
being contrastingly associated with a significantly lower likelihood of that analyst being 
called upon again in future calls.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a brief 
background and literature review. Section II describes the data we use, while Section III 
explores firm behavior in casting earnings conference calls.  Section IV examines the impact 
of casting on firms; Section V presents international evidence; and Section VI explores the 
mechanism in more detail.  Section VII concludes. 
 
I. Background and Literature Review 
Our paper adds to a large literature examining firms’ attempts to manage their 
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information environments, the manner in which firms disclose information to the markets, 
and the impact of different forms of disclosure on various stakeholder groups (e.g., investors, 
customers, regulators, media, etc.).  A series of recent papers, for example, studies the 
impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (“RegFD”), which was designed to combat selective 
disclosure by firms.  Effective October 23, 2000, companies must reveal any material 
information to all investors and analysts simultaneously in the case of intentional 
disclosures, or within 24 hours in the case of unintentional disclosures. According to SEC 
Proposed Rule S7-31-99, regulators believed that allowing selective disclosure was "not in 
the best interests of investors or the securities markets generally." Several recent papers 
examining the impact of Regulation FD on the behavior of equity analysts conclude that 
the law has in fact been effective in curtailing selective disclosure to analysts (see, for 
example, Mohanram and Sunder (2006), Groysberg, Healy, Chapman, Shanthikumar and 
Gui (2007), Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010), Agrawal, Chadha, and Chen (2006), and 
Gintschel and Markov (2004)).  Our paper is unique in that we take as given the “level 
playing field” imposed by Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD), and explore the subtle 
choices firms can make even within this seemingly strict information disclosure 
environment, choices that can (as we document) have large implications for market prices 
and firm outcomes. 
Since the laboratory we exploit is that of quarterly earnings conference calls, our 
paper is also relevant to a large literature studying the relationship between firms and 
analysts, as well as studies of the information content of earnings announcements and 
earnings conference calls specifically.3  For example, a recent strand of the literature 
examines management communication during conference calls and its association with 
information content (Hollander, Pronk and Roelofsen (2010), Matsumoto, Pronk and 
Roelofsen (2011)), information asymmetry (Chen, Hollander, and Law (2014)), future 
performance (Mayew and Venkatachalam (2012)) and financial fraud and misreporting 
(Larcker and Zakolyukina (2011), and Hobson, Mayew and Venkatachalam (2012)). In 
                                                 
3 For instance, Hirshleifer et al. (2009), DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), and Neissner (2013) all give evidence 
that managers attempt to time disclosures around times of low perceived investor attention.  There is also 
an accompanying literature examining the release of negative news (see, for example Kothari et al. (2009), 
Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008), and Westphal and Deephouse (2011)).  
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addition, Zhou (2014) uses textual analysis to analyze when corporate executives blame 
poor performance on external factors such as the industry or the broader economy.  Chen 
and Matsumoto (2006) also find that in the pre-Reg FD period that analysts with access 
to management deliver more accurate earnings forecasts.  Closest to this paper are the 
findings in Mayew (2008) and Mayew, Sharp, and Venkatachalam (2013), who also 
document and explore differential analyst participation on conference calls; however, their 
focus is primarily on the implications for analyst accuracy.  Our focus, by contrast, is on 
the asset pricing implications of casting, along with future firm behavior and outcomes.  
 
II. Data and Summary Statistics 
We draw from a variety of data sources to construct the sample we use in this 
paper.  A critical input to our study is the earnings conference call transcript data.  We 
obtain these transcripts from Thomson Reuters, specifically from the StreetEvents data 
feed.  We collect the complete transcripts of all US conference calls for the period of 2003 
to the first quarter of 2015. We also obtain, from the same source, all available conference 
calls in Canada, UK, France, and Japan for the period of 2003 to 2014. We isolate the 
name of the firm conducting the call, along with the name and affiliation of all analysts 
covering the firm conducting the call.  In practice, firms know the identities of all listeners 
to the call, as each person must dial in through a conference call-in service that requires 
them to sign in at the outset of each call; the company then filters who can ask questions, 
the order of the queue, and when to end the call. 
With regard to the call mechanics, we have contacted, and had a number of 
discussions with, the largest of these conference call providers: InterCall (a subsidiary of 
West Corporation), which administers over 85% of all quarterly conference calls for the 
Fortune 100.  Many employ the industry-standard product called Leader-View, which 
allows a firm’s “call-team” – which from InterCall has a modal constituency of the 
CEO/CFO, head of Investor Relations, Legal Counsel, and two to three other company 
executives - to see a computer screen with everyone that has entered the call.  This “call-
team” then has a private line to the operator at InterCall who is orchestrating the call.  
What the firm sees on Leader-View is a list of participants in the call, along with affiliation 
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of each participant, and a flag for whether the participant has indicated interest in asking 
a question during the Q&A.  Through their private communication line, the firm’s call-
team indicates to the operator who it would like to call on, and at what point during the 
call it would like to call on that participant.  The operator then introduces the questioner 
chosen by the firm - this is why conference call transcripts are filled with lines such as: 
“Operator:  Next up we’ll hear from Colin Gillis from BGC Partners.”  When the firm 
decides, it indicates to InterCall, and the Q&A portion of the call comes to a close.   
As mentioned above, we obtain the conference call transcript data for all publicly 
traded firms from 2003 through the first quarter of 2015 from the Thomson StreetEvents 
Database.  In the StreetEvents data, we extract the full text of all earnings calls, the names 
of all company affiliates present, the names of analysts who were called upon to ask a 
question during the call, coding every exchange between questioner and replier during the 
call.  We attempted to obtain the full participant list (those who did and did not ask 
questions) from both InterCall and the underlying firms, but neither would provide this 
full set of participants (specifically the set of participants that “indicated” they wanted to 
ask a question, but were not able to).4   
To construct our dataset, we first hand-match the StreetEvents analyst names for 
each call back to the brokerage house and analyst last name and first initial available on 
IBES, using a conservative matching procedure. This allows us to match the data to IBES, 
so that we can obtain data on past forecast accuracy and past recommendation levels.  For 
some of our additional tests, we also examine the text of each question in order to assess 
the difficulty of the question. 
In addition to analysts’ past forecasts and recommendations, we also obtain analyst 
data on length of career, Institutional Investor All Star status, and other selected analyst 
biographical items (such as past employment) from ZoomInfo.  We also collect additional 
                                                 
4 We do tests specifically on calls in which all analysts who indicate interest in asking a question are called 
upon (tests in Section IV). In addition, in Appendix Table A7 we show that analysts who are able to ask 
questions during the call have significant increases in their future forecast accuracy following the call. 
Anecdotally, we also contacted a number of analysts directly, and in those conversations the analysts 
commented that it was a “job-requirement” to call-in (and if possible to ask questions) during the conference 
calls.  One recounted an instance where a lead-analyst at his firm had not called in, and it being mentioned 
at the lead analyst’s performance review.  
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firm-level data, such as firm restatements over our sample period from the Audit Analytics 
database, as well as monthly stock returns, shares outstanding, volume, and market 
capitalization from CRSP, and a variety of firm-specific accounting variables from 
Compustat. For our international sample, we obtain their daily stock returns from 
Datastream. In sum, our evidence spans 5 countries, 13 years, 4101 firms, and 7125 
analysts, covering 91,878 conference calls.  
Table I presents summary statistics from our final dataset.  Panel A reports statistics 
for our U.S. dataset, and Panel B reports numbers for our pooled international dataset, 
consisting of observations from the UK, Canada, France, and Japan.  Each analyst covering 
a given stock is designated as “in” for a particular conference call if she was called on 
during that call, and “out” if she was not called on during that call.  An analyst is said to 
be “covering” a stock if she has produced a stock recommendation for a given stock in the 
IBES database in the past year.  Table I shows that an average of 3.73 unique analysts 
(out of an average of 9.93 analysts covering a stock) are called on during a typical quarterly 
earnings call.  In a preview of some of our results, Table I also shows that analysts who are 
called tend to issue more optimistic recommendations in the year prior to the call (an 
average of 3.75 on a 1-5 scale, where 1=Strong Sell, 2=Sell, 3=Hold, 4=Buy, 5=Strong 
Buy) relative to other analysts covering the stock (=3.61).  The average level difference in 
analyst recommendations between the two groups (equal to 0.15) is statistically significant 
and of the same magnitude as the optimism effect associated with “affiliation” (i.e., when 
a firm has an underwriting relationship with the analyst’s brokerage house), which is the 
subject of a vast analyst literature (see, for example, Lin and McNichols (1998), Lin et al. 
(2005), Michaely and Womack (1999), Hong and Kubik (2003)).  Panel B shows a similar, 
although somewhat smaller, unconditional difference between the average recommendation 
levels of the two analyst groups (RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)=0.08) in the international data.  
Note that Appendix Table A1 reports some additional firm-level summary statistics; 
relative to the average firm on CRSP, our sample is tilted towards stocks that are larger, 
have lower book-to-market ratios (i.e., are more “growth-like” in nature), and have higher 
institutional ownership.  
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III. Firm Behavior on Earnings Conference Calls 
A. Analyst Recommendations and Conference Call Participation 
We begin by examining the likelihood of an analyst being called upon in a quarterly 
earnings conference call.  Specifically, we run panel regressions where the dependent 
variable (IN) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the analyst was called on during a call, 
and 0 if the analyst was not; the main independent variable of interest is the analyst’s 
recommendation level prior to the conference call. We focus on the average recommendation 
in the year prior to the call rather than the most recent recommendation of each analyst; 
this is because firm managers may not be immediately aware of the most recent 
recommendation updates by individual analysts, and thus have to rely on the historical 
average to identify “friendly” vs. “unfriendly” analysts. Using lagged recommendations also 
helps alleviate the concern that our results are driven by the information content of recent 
recommendation changes. 
We also control for a variety of other determinants of call participation, including 
several analyst-level variables (such as the number of years the analyst has worked in the 
industry, the number of years the analyst has covered the firm in question, the number of 
stocks currently covered by the analyst, the number of stocks currently covered by the 
analyst’s brokerage firm, a dummy if the analyst was named an Institutional Investor All-
Star analyst within the past year, and a dummy indicating whether the analyst is affiliated 
with a brokerage house that underwrites for the firm in question5),  and numerous firm-
level measures (such as size, book-to-market ratio, past year returns, share turnover, and 
idiosyncratic volatility).  We then test the hypothesis that firms choose to call on or “cast” 
their earnings calls with analysts who were more favorable in their past recommendations 
on these firms. 
Table II, using data on all US publicly traded firms from 2003-2015, confirms the 
finding in Mayew (2008) that firms do indeed call on analysts who issue more favorable 
recommendations in the year leading up to a conference call.  Further, Table II shows that 
this effect persists even after controlling for a host of analyst- and firm-level variables 
                                                 
5 We thank Alok Kumar and Kelvin Law for providing data on affiliation of all analysts and brokerage houses 
in our sample.  See Kumar (2010) for more details. 
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known to correlate with analyst recommendations, and after including firm-quarter fixed 
effects (in Columns 1-2, thus comparing in and out analysts covering the same firm in the 
same quarter), and after including analyst-time fixed effects (in Columns 3-4, thus 
comparing in and out stocks covered by the same analyst in the same quarter).6  The 
estimates in Columns 1-4 imply that for a one-notch increase in analyst recommendation 
level (roughly a one-standard deviation move), the likelihood of being called on increases 
by about 6%, relative to an unconditional probability of 38% (so a 16% increase in the 
likelihood).  In Columns 5 and 6, we run the same regressions but now using a logit 
specification, again using being “called on” as the 0/1 dependent variable, and the average 
prior recommendation level (minus the average recommendation level for that firm prior 
to the call) as the independent variable of interest; these tests again reveal a positive and 
significant effect of prior recommendation level on the likelihood of being called on during 
an earnings conference call. In terms of economic magnitude, the marginal effect of a one-
standard-deviation increase in recommendation is associated with a 5.7%-6.9% increase in 
the likelihood of being called. 
    
B. Types of Firms that Call on Bullish Analysts, and Incidence of Casting 
Next we examine the behavior and characteristics of firms that tend to call 
specifically on analysts with higher past recommendations.  Our first test explores the 
determinants of firms’ casting decisions.  Our key measure of casting, RECD(IN)-
RECD(OUT), equals the difference in average recommendation level by “in” analysts (i.e., 
those analysts called upon during the conference call) versus “out” analysts (i.e., those 
analysts not called upon, but who cover the firm in the given quarter), measured in the 
one year prior to the conference call.  We then run panel regressions with this firm-level 
(RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)) variable on the left-hand side of the regression, and present the 
results in Table III.7 
                                                 
6 Appendix Table A2 shows that controlling directly for the number of times the analyst has been called on 
in the past (PASTCALL), has no effect on these results from Table II.  Also note that including firm-analyst 
fixed effects in these Table II regressions has no effect on the results either. 
7 We find nearly identical results using an alternate measure of casting, termed RECD(IN)>RECD(OUT), 
which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the average recommendation of analysts speaking on the call is higher 
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For our explanatory variables, we start by analyzing two measures that plausibly 
capture a firm’s incentive to call on more favorable analysts.  First, we examine 
discretionary accruals, as firms with higher accruals may have an incentive to call on bullish 
analysts to avoid a potentially unfavorable discussion of the specific composition of their 
earnings.  We also create a dummy variable equal to one if a firm’s earnings surprise in the 
quarter in question is exactly 0 or 1 cent, since firms that just meet (or barely exceed) 
consensus forecasts may want to avoid any difficult questions about the precise manner in 
which they hit their forecasts so narrowly.   
We also control for the same firm-level variables defined in Table II, and run the 
tests as panel regressions with firm and time (quarter) fixed effects and standard errors 
double-clustered at both the firm and quarter level.  In addition, we include controls for: 
analyst forecast dispersion (measured as the standard deviation of analysts’ outstanding 
quarterly EPS forecasts); and analyst recommendation dispersion (measured as the 
standard deviation of analysts’ outstanding recommendations); analyst coverage (the 
number of unique analyst estimates made in the 12 months leading up to the call); 
institutional ownership (the proportion of the firm that is held by institutional investors); 
and the idiosyncratic volatility of the firm (measured as the standard deviation of the four-
factor adjusted monthly return over the past 12 months).   
Columns 1-3 of Table III show that discretionary accruals (ACCRUAL) and the 
dummy for meeting or barely exceeding consensus earnings forecasts (SUE(0)) are both 
positive and significant predictors of RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT), consistent with the idea 
that firms with the largest incentive to call on favorable analysts are exactly the firms that 
do so.  In terms of magnitude, a one-standard deviation move in accruals leads to a 6.5% 
increase in RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT).  In addition, firms that meet or barely exceed 
forecasts have a 20% higher value of RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT).8 
In Columns 4-7 of Table III we explore the future behavior of firms after they engage 
in casting behavior.  Specifically, we run logit regressions in order to examine the predictive 
                                                 
than the average recommendation of those who do not speak on the call.   
8 Controlling for the magnitude of the SUE (standardized unexpected earnings) itself in all of the regressions 
in Table III has no effect on these results. 
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power of casting on a given call for several firm (and executive) behaviors during the 
following quarter.  Our first dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
firm in question issues a secondary equity offering (SEO) in quarter t+1, as firms issuing 
equity in the near future may want to avoid the release of any potential bad news that 
could decrease their issuance proceeds.  Second, we create a dummy variable equal to one 
if the insiders of the firm conducting the call on aggregate engage in net-selling of their 
insider owned shares – the idea being that firms may want to prop up their stock price 
(delay the release of bad news) if they plan to engage in sales of their shares, as they would 
like to sell the shares at the highest price possible. Third, we create a dummy variable 
equal to one if a firm’s top executives exercise their stock options in the following quarter, 
and zero otherwise; again the idea is that executives ideally would like to exercise their 
options at the highest share-price possible.  And finally, we create a dummy variable equal 
to one if a firm’s top executives receive an option grant in the following quarter, and zero 
otherwise; here the idea is the opposite of the exercise variable, since in this case an 
executive hopes to receive a grant at the lowest price possible. 
Columns 4-7 show that casting behavior (RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)) is indeed a 
positive and significant predictor of future equity issuance (SEO), future insider selling 
(INSIDER), and future option exercise by management (OPTIONEXCS), and a negative 
and significant predictor of option grants (GRANT).  In terms of marginal impact, a one-
standard deviation move in RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT) leads to a 6% increase in the 
likelihood of SEO issuance, a 3% increase in the likelihood of insider selling, a 2% increase 
in the likelihood of option exercise by management, and a 5% decrease in the likelihood of 
option grants given to management (all as a fraction of their corresponding unconditional 
probabilities). 
One important question is the extent to which we are capturing the information 
staging activities of a few firms that engage in this frequently throughout our sample, or 
whether this is a more systematic activity engaged in by a large universe of firms at 
precisely those times when it is most valuable for any given firm to withhold negative 
information.  However, note that Columns 1-3 of Table III include both firm and quarter 
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fixed effects.9  If it were simply a subset of firms always casting their calls, the firm fixed 
effect would capture this, and these independent variables would be insignificant upon the 
inclusion of the fixed effects.  In contrast, Table III shows that even controlling for firm 
fixed effects, all of the results on motivators for potentially wanting to cast a call (e.g., 
earnings management) are highly significant.   
One persistent firm-level variable worth mentioning is the corporate governance G-
index measure of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).  This measure is highly persistent at 
the firm level, so one would expect that firm fixed effects would largely capture this 
measure, and we confirm this in our data.  Without firm fixed effects, the coefficient on 
the G-Index is 0.0037 (t=2.37), suggesting that casting behavior is positively related to 
poor governance, but this result is no longer significant once firm fixed effects are included.  
In Figure 2 we graph the histogram of frequency of quarters that each firm casting 
episode in our sample lasts.  In theory, once a firm begins to “cast” their conference call 
(RECD(IN)>RECD(OUT)), they could continue this behavior indefinitely.  As we have 36 
quarters in our sample, if the firm is present throughout the entire sample, the maximum 
casting length could be 36 quarters, with the minimum 1 (as we are conditioning on it 
being a casting episode).  What we see from Figure 2 is that the most common length for 
a casting episode is one quarter.  Also note that in Appendix Figure A1, we compute two 
“placebo” figures, one of which represents a histogram of casting spells under the 
assumption that firms calls on firms randomly, and another which is a histogram of spells 
of non-casting episodes (where RECD(IN)<RECD(OUT)); the casting distribution 
depicted in Figure 2 is noticeably more fat-tailed relative to these two placebos, and also 
statistically different from both in a Chi-Squared test. 
  These histograms, along with the firm fixed effects not impacting the results in 
Table III, suggests that casting is something a wide range of firms engage in selectively at 
precisely those times they have strong incentives to do so, and we are not identifying a 
behavior solely driven by a few firms that continuously cast their calls. 
 To further explore the magnitude and incidence of casting across time and across 
                                                 
9 Note that if we re-run Columns 4-7 using OLS with firm and quarter fixed effects, instead of logit regressions, 
the results are similar to those presented here. 
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the population of firms in our sample, Table IV plots the distribution of casting 
(RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)) by year, both according to percentiles of the distribution (in 
Panel A), and using fixed thresholds (in Panel B).  As we show later in Table VI, exploring 
the tails of the casting distribution (i.e., firms where RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT) is 
particularly high, e.g., greater than the 90% percentile) results in even stronger results than 
our baseline findings, suggesting that these higher thresholds capture “extreme” casting 
more cleanly.  Panel A of Table IV shows that RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT) is (on average) 
significantly higher in 2008 than in other years, consistent with the idea that casting 
behavior was more prevalent during the financial crisis.  Panel B indicates that the 
percentage of firms with RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)>0 is roughly 60% across the sample.  At 
the threshold of 0.6 (a one-standard deviation move above the RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)=0 
benchmark), we find between 17-22% of firms in a given quarter fall into this category; this 
number represents a possible estimate of the general incidence of casting in the population 
of firms. 
Collectively, the results in this section indicate that during our full 2003-2015 sample 
of the universe of quarterly earnings calls, firms are more likely to call on analysts who 
have issued more favorable recommendations on these firms leading up to the call.  
Moreover, this type of behavior is most pronounced among firms with the strongest 
incentives to manage the flow of information to the market, such as firms with higher 
discretionary accruals, firms that barely meet/exceed earnings expectations, and firms (or 
executives) about to issue equity, sell shares, or exercise their stock options in the near 
future. 
 
IV. The Impact of Casting on Firms 
In this section we explore what happens to the firms that call on more favorable 
analysts during earnings conference calls.  We exploit cross-sectional and time series 
variation in the extent to which firms engage in this type of behavior, and importantly 
when they choose to cast their calls. We explore the impact of casting on a host of future 
firm-specific outcomes, such as future stock returns, future earnings surprises, and future 
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earnings restatements.  
 
A. Future Earnings Announcement Returns and Future Earnings Surprises 
If firms calling on favorable analysts are doing so in order to portray the most 
positive view to the market and potentially hide any negative information from coming to 
light, our hypothesis is that firms engaging in this type of behavior are more likely to 
experience negative future outcomes, such as negative future earnings surprises, as this 
news will ultimately be revealed to the market (it likely cannot be hidden forever).  We 
test this idea by running forecasting regressions of future earnings announcement returns 
and future earnings surprises on the lagged spread between average recommendation levels 
(in the prior year) of analysts called on vs. those not called on (RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)) 
during the last earnings call, plus a host of additional control variables.  We measure 
announcement returns using cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the earnings 
date, and earnings surprises using SUEs, and control for the same firm-level variables used 
in Table III.  Again, since these CARs and earnings surprises are measured around the 
subsequent earnings announcement relative to the one-quarter lagged casting measure, 
these regressions are strictly predictive in nature.  We conduct quarterly Fama-MacBeth 
regressions for both CARs and SUEs, controlling for the following lagged firm-level 
variables: market capitalization; book-to-market ratio; prior year returns; share turnover 
over the past 12 months; analysts’ recommendation dispersion; idiosyncratic volatility, 
institutional holdings, and analyst coverage.   
Columns 1-3 of Table V show that firms that call more on favorable analysts (i.e., 
those with higher values of RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)) experience more negative future 
announcement returns (CARs). For example, the coefficient of -0.259 in Column 3 implies 
that for a one-standard deviation move in (RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)) this period, CARs 
are 39% lower at the next announcement (computed relative to the sample mean CAR of 
40 basis points).  Controlling for additional known predictors of future earnings returns, 
such as net insider selling behavior, discretionary accruals (Sloan (1996), Hirshleifer, Hou, 
and Teoh (2012), etc.), analyst forecast dispersion (Diether et al. (2002)), etc., have no 
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effect on this return predictability.10  Columns 4-6 of Table V show a similar effect for 
future earnings surprises.  In terms of the magnitude of this effect, a one-standard deviation 
move in (RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)) this period implies a lower earnings surprise by over 
20% of the interquartile range for the next announcement, so an economically large impact. 
 
B. Isolating Cases Where Management Left No Questions Unanswered 
Our evidence so far is less consistent with a view that the patterns we document are 
driven solely from the analyst side, i.e., that optimistic analysts are the only analysts who 
choose to speak on an earnings call, and that firms are merely passive actors in this process.  
In particular, the timing of the firm-level behaviors documented in Section III.B is hard to 
reconcile with this alternate view, since the analysts would have to choose to show up and 
speak only on the calls that exactly coincide with these behaviors, which seems implausible.   
That said, we cannot “prove” that management denied access to particular analysts 
on a given call, since we do not have data on the “operator lists” that flag all those wishing 
to ask questions.11  In order to further explore this alternative story, however, we also went 
through and parsed our entire dataset and manually examined each conference call 
transcript in order to identify all the calls where phrases such as “There are no more 
questions in the queue” are spoken by management or by a moderator at the very end of 
the call.  For these calls, it appears that management was not casting the call, since for 
these calls management actively entertained and took all questions from the call 
participants, ostensibly ending the conference call only when there were no further 
questions.  Therefore, for these calls we can plausibly assume that management was at least 
not “refusing” to allow any additional questions from certain analysts in the audience.  
There may have been (negative) analysts who did not want to ask questions, but we can 
at least rule out the possibility that management was actively disallowing additional 
                                                 
10 Also if we run these regressions on the set of firms who do not issue SEOs, to ensure that our results are 
not driven by post-SEO underperformance, we find that the coefficient on RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT) in 
predicting future CARs is -0.229 (t=2.38), which is very similar to the figure reported in Column 3 of Table 
V. 
11 As mentioned above, we attempted numerous times (and methods) of obtaining the full participant list 
from both InterCall and the underlying firms, but neither would provide the full set of participants (nor the 
set of participants that “indicated” they wanted to ask a question, but were not able to). 
Playing Favorites – Page 18 
 
 
questions that the audience wished to ask. 
We take this set of calls and create a dummy variable called “NoMoreQuestion” 
which is set equal to one for all the calls where phrases such as (“There are no more 
questions in the queue”) are used to close the call.  We find that these types of phrases are 
used in 25-30% of the calls.  In Panel B of Table V, we then interact this dummy variable 
with our indicator for a casted call (RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)), and re-run the basic future 
earnings CAR test from Table V.  The idea is that for these calls in which (presumably) 
all questions have been allowed to be asked, the firm is not then casting the call.  Thus, 
any variation in (RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)) we observe in these calls should essentially be 
random noise, such that (RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)) will mean something different for these 
non-casted calls.  In particular, (RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)) now being random, it should 
have no predictive power for future firm earnings events, returns, etc., in contrast to what 
we see for choreographed earnings calls. 
The results are shown in the new Table V, Panel B.  The interaction term of 
(RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)) and NoMoreQuestion is significantly positive.  Further, 
combining this with the main effect on (RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)) gives an estimated 
impact of (RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)) in calls where all questions are allowed to be asked 
that is statistically equal to zero for both future earnings surprises and returns around those 
future earnings events. Meanwhile, the negative returns are concentrated on the calls where 
this phrase does *not* occur, which in our view are much more likely to be the strategically 
cast calls that drive our key results. 
Collectively, our results appear consistent with a view that firms are - at the very 
least - active partner participants in this process, in terms of being opportunistic with 
information release, and as such are taking an active role in casting these calls.  
 
C. “Extreme” Cases of Casting 
In Table VI we explore the ability of the extreme tails of the distribution of casting 
(RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)) to predict future CARs.  We do this in order to examine if the 
return predictability we document in Table V increases monotonically as the extent of 
casting increases, as our thesis would suggest if casting is driving the future return 
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relationship we have documented.  Specifically, Table VI replicates the approach in Table 
V but employs a dummy variable construction for the variable of interest (RECD(IN)-
RECD(OUT)), and explores the impact of casting above certain thresholds.  For instance, 
Column 6 of Table VI shows that the coefficient on casting “greater than 90%” (meaning 
that the value of RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT) for that firm is above the 90th percentile across 
all firms in a given quarter) is -0.430 (t=2.77), which is larger than the coefficient on casting 
above the 75% threshold (=-0.327, t=2.17).12 
 
D. Portfolio Returns 
Next we employ a portfolio approach to examine if the CAR returns documented 
above show up in calendar-time portfolios.  In terms of portfolio construction, the casting 
of the call is known directly upon the conclusion of the call.  Thus, in theory it could be 
traded upon the next calendar day.  However, in the data we find that the market updates 
– and the return revelation from the casting occurs - on average when the “hidden” 
information is actually revealed in the poor future earnings announcement.  Certainly, ex-
ante theory does not suggest that it had to be the next earnings announcement, as the 
markets could have begun to figure this out (and so incorporated it into price) the following 
trading day, for instance.  However, in the data we find something very different – unlike 
traditional underreaction-type regularities (e.g., Momentum or PEAD), we do not see an 
initial somewhat large response in the “right” direction only be followed by trickling up (or 
down) in the same direction over the coming weeks or months.  Instead, we see returns 
move modestly in the opposite direction (as the market seems fooled by the overly 
optimistic tone of the positive-analyst dominated call, which we discuss in more detail in 
Section VI), and the market subsequently only “realizing” the negative information at the 
next earnings, when (on average) firms underperform along with miss expectations.  Thus, 
the strategy that we implement takes into account this behavior, by investing solely in the 
week surrounding the next earnings (t-2, t+2).   
                                                 
12 We have also broken out earnings announcements associated with firms’ fiscal year-ends, to examine if the 
results are stronger at these times, but the coefficient on RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT) in predicting future CARs 
is not significantly different from the coefficient reported in Table V for the full sample. 
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The strategy is thus a calendar-time portfolio that holds each of its constituents for 
one week, with daily rebalancing (so containing a mix of (t-2) firms, (t-1) firms,..., (t+2) 
firms, at any given time).  The portfolio’s size and dynamics over the calendar year are 
shown Appendix Figure A4.  The average number of stocks in the portfolio at any time is 
89.  Not surprisingly, there is a seasonality in the number of constituents that varies with 
the earnings calendar.   
The portfolios are rebalanced daily, and aggregated up to monthly figures that are 
reported in Table VII.  Panel A presents excess returns (in excess of the 3-month Treasury 
bill), 1-factor (CAPM), 3-factor Fama-French, 4-factor Carhart, and 5-factor (including 
the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor) alphas, and Panel B presents factor loadings.13     
 Panel A of Table VII indicates that the Long/Short (Q1 minus Q5) portfolio earns 
monthly abnormal returns ranging from 129 basis points (t=2.59) to 149 basis points 
(t=2.64) per month, or roughly 18 percent abnormal returns per year.14  Out of the 129 
basis points, around 38% is due to the spread on the long side (Q1 minus Q3), and the 
remaining 62% due to the spread on the short side (Q5 minus Q3).15 
Importantly, as shown earlier in Table V in a regression context, Appendix Table 
A3 also demonstrates in a portfolio setting that the return predictability we demonstrate 
in this paper is not simply a repackaging of the well-known predictability associated with 
either discretionary accruals or analyst forecast dispersion.  Controlling for both accruals 
and forecast dispersion as factor mimicking portfolios, we show that the return 
predictability associated with casting conference calls remains large and significant.  
Moreover, in Appendix Table A11 we show that the returns are also robust to the 
alternative factor models of Fama and French (2015) - a five factor model incorporating 
profitability (RMW) and investment policy (CMA) factors), and the production-motivated 
                                                 
13 Note that here in these initial tests we are using the daily, realized timing of earnings announcements, 
which may not be perfectly knowable in advance.  In Appendix Table A4, we instead use predicted earnings 
announcement months, which are forecasted a year in advance, and present the returns to simple monthly, 
calendar-time portfolios using these, in addition. 
14 This portfolio return result is not driven by Friday announcements.  Excluding all Friday announcements, 
the spread portfolio still earns 123 basis points per month (t=2.53). 
15 As can be seen from Panel A of Table VII, the average abnormal return across all quintiles in our sample 
is positive. This is consistent with a large literature (see Frazzini and Lamont (2006) for a summary) 
documenting an “earnings announcement premium” for all stocks announcing earnings in a particular month. 
Playing Favorites – Page 21 
 
 
q-model of Hou, Zue, and Zhang (2015) – including investment and ROE factors.  
 As mentioned above, the negative information that firms appear to be hiding by 
casting their calls could be released into the market at any point following the earnings 
call.  Transcriptions of the calls are publicly available during our sample period usually 
within hours (or minutes) of the call itself.16 
In Appendix Figure A2, we thus examine event time returns following the earnings 
call that was cast by the firm.  This figure plots the event time abnormal stock returns for 
the 12 months following portfolio formation of the long-short portfolio in Table VII (short 
firms that cast, long firms that do not cast). The figure begins charting abnormal returns 
(DGTW characteristically-adjusted) directly after the earnings announcement in which the 
firm cast (or did not cast).  We see that the returns to this L-S portfolio concentrate 
primarily around the subsequent earnings announcement (Month 3).  Critically, while there 
is a return shock at the subsequent earnings call, this shock in abnormal returns never 
reverses following Month 3.  Given that prices react sharply around subsequent information 
revelation and never revert, far from being overreaction, this suggests that the negative 
information that was hidden by the firms, and is subsequently revealed, is information 
fundamentally important for firm value.  
 
E. Future Earnings Restatements 
Given the findings on future negative earnings surprises, and the future negative stock 
returns associated with these casting firms, and in particular the results in Table III 
suggesting that casting firms tend to be those with higher discretionary accruals, a natural 
question is to what extent this type of behavior predicts future earnings restatements and 
accounting irregularities.  Ultimately, in the future the market seems to realize the negative 
information that these firms were withholding during their prior earnings calls, and in the 
same manner we might expect abnormal accruals ultimately may be undone in the form of 
future earnings restatements.  To test this conjecture, we run a predictive regression of 
future restatements (drawn from the Audit Analytics database) in quarter t+1 on lagged 
                                                 
16 For instance, Morningstar, Inc. and Thomson Reuters offer subscription products, while Seeking Alpha and 
Earnings Impact offer free access to transcripts following earnings calls. 
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RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT), plus the same firm-level control variables used in Tables V and 
VI.  Table VIII confirms that RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT) is a positive and significant 
predictor of future earnings restatements. In particular, as shown in Columns 1-3, a one 
standard-deviation move in (RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)) this period predicts a 32% increase 
in the likelihood of future restatements by the firm, as a fraction of the unconditional 
probability of having a restatement. Again, as can be seen in Columns 4-6, this result is 
concentrated in conference calls where the management is likely to be casting, and 
completely disappears if we focus solely on the set of conference calls ending with no more 
questions in the queue. 
 
V. International Evidence 
In this section, we explore international evidence on earnings conference calls. We do 
this for two reasons.  First, any paper that shows evidence of stock return predictability is 
strengthened by the use of out-of-sample evidence, since this helps to assuage concerns 
about data mining.  Second, the U.S. sample period we explore in Section IV all takes place 
in the period after the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD) (in August of 
2000) as well as the subsequent Global Analyst Research Settlement (in April of 2003).  
RegFD mandated that all publicly traded companies must disclose material information to 
all investors at the same time, and potentially changed the extent to which analysts can 
benefit from especially close relationships with firms (e.g., through additional underwriting 
links between their brokerage house and the firms in question).  The Global Settlement 
was an enforcement agreement reached between the SEC, NASD, NYSE, and ten of the 
largest brokerage houses that sought to address conflicts of interest within brokerage houses 
specifically with regard to analyst recommendations.   
Although these changes mean that our sample takes place entirely within the current 
regulatory regime--and hence the most relevant one on a forward-looking basis—in this 
section we explore out-of-sample evidence to investigate whether or not our findings extend 
to other settings and other regulatory regimes.  We cannot go back to the “pre-RegFD” 
sample, because we do not have transcript data available in that period,17 but we can 
                                                 
17 We attempted to obtain data pre-2003, but Thomson only kept electronic transcripts of conference calls 
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explore international evidence.  As described in Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010), the 
regulatory environment in many other countries (e.g., the United Kingdom) did not change 
over this period, meaning that the structural shift in the disclosure environment experienced 
in the U.S. since the early 2000s has not been replicated outside the U.S.  Therefore, 
exploring non-U.S. evidence can help determine the extent to which our findings are 
confined to the current U.S. regulatory environment. 
To investigate this question, we compile international transcript data from four 
countries: the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Japan.  This required an intensive 
hand-matching process in order to match these transcripts to the firms and analysts listed 
in the I/B/E/S database.  Collectively, the international sample contains an additional 
7770 unique conference calls, covering 637 firms, 2723 analysts, and 12 years.   
In Table IX we replicate our tests from Table II that explore the likelihood of being 
called on during a conference call, for these four foreign countries.  As in Table II, the 
dependent variable in Table IX is an indicator that takes the value of one if the analyst 
asks a question on the call, and zero otherwise.  Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 of Table IX conduct 
a panel OLS regression, where the main independent variable is the average 
recommendation level of the analyst in the year prior to the conference call (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹); 
Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 conduct a pooled logit regression, where the main independent 
variable is the average prior-year recommendation level of the analyst relative to the firm’s 
consensus recommendation (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂).  Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 also include firm*quarter 
fixed effects.  
Table IX shows that for all specifications, across all four countries, the level of an 
analyst’s prior recommendation is a positive and significant predictor of the likelihood of 
being called on during an earnings call.  In terms of the marginal effect (from the logit 
regressions), a one-standard deviation move in recommendation level is associated with a 
2.2%, 1.8%, 1.2%, and 2.2% increase in the likelihood of having the opportunity to ask a 
question in a conference call in Canada, UK, France, and Japan, respectively.  Collectively, 
these findings confirm that casting behavior by corporations on earnings conference calls is 
an international phenomenon, and not one that is confined to the U.S., or to the current 
                                                 
starting in 2003, and we could not find another source that had transcribed data before this time period. 
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regulatory regime in the U.S. 
 Next we examine the future earnings announcement returns associated with the 
casting behavior that we observe outside the U.S.  We present these results in Table X.  
As in Table V, this table reports forecasting regressions of earnings announcement day 
returns on lagged differences in average recommendations between analysts that ask 
questions in the conference call and those that do not in the international setting. Our 
sample includes conference calls in four foreign countries: Canada (column 1), UK (column 
2), France (column 3), and Japan (column 4). In column 5, we pool all observations from 
the four countries together. The dependent variable in each column is the cumulative 
abnormal return in the five day window around the future subsequent earnings 
announcement (CAR, in %). The main independent variable is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the average lagged recommendation level of in-analysts is larger than that of out-
analysts (RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)), and zero otherwise.  
 Consistent with the U.S. evidence, Table X shows that casting behavior on an 
international earnings call predicts significantly negative future announcement returns on 
the subsequent earnings event.  This finding holds true for all four foreign countries. In 
terms of magnitude, as shown in Column 5, when pooling observations across all four 
countries, we find that a one-standard-deviation move in RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT) predicts 
a 32bp (t=3.21) lower earnings announcement return in the next quarter.   
In sum, the out-of-sample evidence we present in this section suggests that our U.S. 
evidence is unlikely to be a result of data mining, nor is it confined to a particular regulatory 
regime in the U.S.  Rather, the casting phenomenon we document, and the impact of this 
behavior on future stock returns, is a global phenomenon engaged in - and experienced by 
- worldwide financial markets.  
 
VI. Additional Tests of Mechanism and Discussion 
In this final section we explore the mechanism at work behind our results in greater 
depth.  To do so, we investigate the nature of the questions asked during earnings calls in 
more detail, both by examining the ordering of analysts called upon during the conference 
call, and by conducting exploratory textual analysis.  We conclude by discussing some 
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potential costs and benefits of the casting phenomenon we document, for both firms and 
analysts. 
 
A. Order of Analysts Called Upon During Call 
First, we examine the order that analysts are called on during these earnings calls.  
The results in Table II (regarding more favorable analysts being called upon during the 
call), imply a natural extension of our tests to examine not just who participates, but when 
they participate on a call.  If company behavior is pre-meditated (and the length of the call 
is somewhat unknown), one would suspect that the true favorites (i.e., bullish analysts) 
might be called upon earlier in the call.  This favoritism in ordering might also extend to 
other analysts with observably “high status” (e.g., All-Star analysts, and/or analysts from 
an affiliated or prestigious brokerage house), followed by analysts from the largest brokerage 
firms, followed by the small firm analysts, and so on down the line. 
Table XI examines the order in which analysts are called upon conditional on being 
in the conference call.  Thus, this analysis is independent of that in Table II, in that it 
examines solely within-call ordering conditional on call participation (as opposed to 
participation or not).  The dependent variable in all columns represents the order of the 
analysts asking questions (e.g., the first questioner would have a value of one). The main 
independent variables include: the recommendation level of the analyst prior to the 
conference call (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹), whether the analyst is an all-star analyst (𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑹𝑹), whether the 
analyst is affiliated with a broker that underwrites for the firm in question (𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑹𝑹), 
and the number of All-Star analysts employed by the broker (𝑷𝑷𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑷𝑷𝑹𝑹), which is a 
common measure of broker prestige. We also interact the analyst’s recommendation with 
these “high status” variables. 
Table XI indicates that bullish analysts are significantly more likely to be called on 
earlier in a call; a one-standard deviation increase in 𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹 brings a questioner forward by 
about two tenths of a position in the queue.  In addition, Table XI shows that All-Star 
analysts, affiliated analysts, and analysts from more prestigious brokerage firms are called 
on earlier in a call.  Further, the interaction terms between the recommendation level and 
the status variables are all negative and significant, suggesting that bullish analysts with 
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status are particularly likely to be called on earlier in a call.  In sum, these results provide 
additional evidence on the extent to which firms manipulate the structure and content of 
their earnings calls. 
 
B. Types of Questions Asked 
To further assess the degree to which firms manage the information environment of 
the call, we explore the aggressiveness of the questions asked by the analysts called upon.  
If firms are trying to conceal negative information by calling on analysts less likely to 
uncover problematic information through their questioning, one might expect to see that 
the questions posed by favorable analysts are more favorable or less probing in some way.  
Gauging the difficulty of a question is obviously a nontrivial exercise without understanding 
the context in which a question is asked.  We use a straightforward, but imperfect, measure, 
and hence view these results as merely suggestive.  Specifically, we measure how “positive” 
each question is by the number of positive relative to negative words in an analyst’s 
question using the Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary, which is constructed for 
financial contexts.  
Appendix Table A5 shows the results examining aggressiveness of question.  
Columns 1 and 2 have as dependent variable the ratio of positive words relative to total 
coded words (#positive + #negative).  Columns 3 and 4 use a slightly different 
specification, with the dependent variable being the log difference between the number of 
positive and negative words in the question.  Columns 1-4 of Appendix Table A5 give a 
consistent message: those analysts who are called on during the call that are more favorable 
ask significantly more positive questions.  In terms of magnitude, the coefficient of 0.031 
(t=2.82) implies that analysts with one notch higher recommendation (e.g., Buy vs. Hold), 
have 3.1% more positive words in their questions.  
 
C. Discussion of Costs and Benefits of Casting for Firms and Analysts 
We conclude by briefly discussing a series of additional results that speak to the 
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issue of the relative costs and benefits of casting for both the firms and the analysts. 
 
i. Potential Firm Benefits: Contemporaneous Investor Response 
We explore one potential benefit that firms receive by engaging in this type of 
behavior.  Specifically, we investigate the investor response around the earnings call in 
which the firm is calling on more favorable analysts.  If the firm is successful in preventing 
the flow of negative information by avoiding negative or cynical analysts, then the stock 
market response around the earnings call may be relatively positive.  In Appendix Table 
A6 we test this idea by running Fama-Macbeth quarterly regressions of contemporaneous 
earnings announcement returns on the spread between recommendation levels of analysts 
in and out of the current call (RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)), plus a host of additional control 
variables (identical to Table V) including the magnitude of the earnings surprise itself.   
Appendix Table A6 indicates that firms have significantly more positive abnormal 
returns around the call when they engage in casting behavior (i.e., call on more favorable 
analysts).  In terms of magnitude, a one standard-deviation increase in (RECD(IN)-
RECD(OUT)) implies a 24% increase in the contemporaneous earnings announcement 
effect (CARt). For robustness, we also compute an indicator variable equal to one if 
RECD(IN) is greater than RECD(OUT) in quarter t (RECD(IN)>RECD(OUT)), which 
again captures the contemporaneous effect of casting on earnings announcement returns in 
that same quarter t.  Columns 4-6 reveals that this indicator variable yields similar results 
as the continuous measure used in Columns 1-3.  In fact, from Column 6, CARs are 41% 
higher in quarters where firms stage their conference calls (RECD(IN)>RECD(OUT)), 
controlling for other determinants of earnings returns including the level of surprise itself. 
   
ii. Future Analyst Accuracy 
On the analyst side, we also explore if analysts who participate on the call are more 
accurate in their earnings forecasts in the future in our sample (see also Mayew (2008) and 
Mayew, Sharp, and Venkatachalam (2011) for similar evidence).  To do so, we run panel 
regressions of future earnings forecast accuracy on a participation dummy, and a host of 
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analyst- and firm-level characteristics.  If an analyst was called on during a given call, the 
dummy equals one; otherwise the dummy is set to zero.  We measure earnings forecast 
error in the next quarter (t+1) in percentage terms as follows: [(absolute_value_of(actual 
earnings in quarter t+1 minus forecasted earnings in quarter t+1)), divided by lagged 
quarter t-1 price].  We include the same analyst- and firm-level controls as in Table II.   
We run several different specifications of this basic test, and report the results in 
Appendix Table A7.  For example, Columns 1-2 include firm-quarter fixed effects, and 
hence examine the relative accuracy of analysts covering the same firm (A is in stock X’s 
call, and B is out of stock X’s call).  Then in Columns 3-4 we include analyst-quarter fixed 
effects, and hence examine the relative accuracy on stocks covered by the same analyst (A 
is in stock X’s call, but is out of stock Y’s call).  Next in Columns 5-6 we include firm-
quarter fixed effects, and examine the relative accuracy of analysts on the same other firm 
(A is in stock X’s call, but not in stock Y’s call, and B is in neither; we examine A and B’s 
forecast accuracy for stock Y). Columns 1-4 of Appendix Table A7 indicate that analysts 
participating in the call are more accurate in their next earnings forecast, both relative to 
other analysts on the same stock who do not participate, and relative to themselves on 
other stocks where they themselves do not participate.  This finding is consistent with the 
idea that analysts receive some benefit to being able to receive answers to their own private 
questions.  In terms of magnitude, the coefficient in Column 4 of -0.028 (t=2.80) suggests 
that being in the call reduces forecast error on the next earnings by 5.4% (of the average 
forecast error) relative to the other firms covered by the same analyst.  Columns 5-6 confirm 
this, further showing only modest evidence that this benefit spills over to their accuracy on 
other stocks.   
  
iii. The Sources of Future Analyst Accuracy 
In order to dig deeper into the sources of this future analyst accuracy, we also 
examine 250 analysts that participate in conference calls. We collect these analysts’ reports 
both before and after their participation in the given conference calls.  In addition, we 
collect the full text of all other analysts covering these same firms both before and after 
the call in which their fellow analyst participated.  This results in us hand-collecting 1774 
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published analyst reports and transcribing them to extract their full texts (representing the 
reports of 637 analysts).  We then take the full text of these reports and compare them to 
the similarity of the questions asked.   
The idea behind the test is that if analysts do ask questions that are privately 
valuable to them in completing their private valuations, or updating their private models 
on the firm (as we find suggestive evidence for with respect to their individual subsequent 
forecast accuracies following conference call participation), we might expect to see this 
reflected in their reports subsequent to the calls. We find evidence consistent with this idea.  
In particular, the text of analysts’ reports show significantly more similarity to the text of 
the questions they themselves just asked in the earnings call, compared to: i.) those of all 
other analysts covering the same firm, and ii.)  those that the same analysts published prior 
to the call.  An important caveat to these results is that inclusion in the call could be 
proxying for better access in general.  Thus, the analysts who are asking their questions 
during the call may also be those that are receiving differential access to management.  It 
could then be the case that they press deeper on the same issues in the private meetings 
that they inquire about in the conference call (e.g., same store sales growth in Europe).  
We also present a number of anecdotal examples of text from questions asked by these 
analysts in the call in Appendix Table A11 that appear to support this idea as well.  Thus 
while only suggestive, these additional findings do provide more depth and color on one 
potential channel through which these bullish analysts gain a relative advantage on 
accuracy (i.e., through access to asking privately valuable questions both through 
conference calls—on which we have evidence—and perhaps also through access outside of 
these calls). 
 
iv. Future Changes in Analyst Coverage 
Next we examine if there is a potential cost to firms of persistently casting their 
calls over time.  Given that there is a benefit to firms in the form of higher contemporaneous 
earnings announcement returns, one might expect virtually all firms to engage in this 
behavior continuously.  One possibility is that firms will lose analyst coverage over time, 
as analysts are unable to ask their own privately-valued questions (which lead to increases 
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in future earnings accuracy as shown above in Appendix Table A7), and become unwilling 
to cover the firm.  Analyst coverage is valuable to a firm as it potentially increases liquidity 
in the stock (see Irvine (2003) for evidence in favor of this idea).   
We test this idea in Appendix Table A8 by running regressions of the change in 
analyst coverage on a measure of “persistent casting,” defined as the average of 
(RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT)) over the prior 4 quarters (or alternatively, as the fraction of 
quarters in which RECD(IN) is greater than RECD(OUT)).  The dependent variable is 
“post-coverage,” defined as coverage after the event year during which we measure 
persistent casting. We also control for “pre-coverage,” which is defined as coverage before 
the event year.   
Appendix Table A8 shows that persistent casting predicts a significant decline in 
future analyst coverage.  In terms of magnitude, the estimates in Column 4 (which uses 
the fraction of quarters in which RECD(IN)>RECD(OUT) to define persistence) imply 
that an additional quarter of casting is associated with a 0.12 drop in analyst coverage the 
following year. In Appendix Table A9, we also show that, perhaps not surprisingly, it is 
the analysts who do not speak on the call that ultimately drop coverage. 
 
v. “Freezing Out” of Bearish Analysts 
 Finally, a related question is why analysts do not publicly speak out against this 
managerial tendency to cast earnings calls.  One hypothesis is that analysts fear that they 
will lose access, both in terms of their ability to ask questions on the call, and in terms of 
their ability to garner private meetings with management.  Anecdotally, we see several 
cases of what appears to be “retribution” by firms towards bearish analysts.  For example, 
the case of analyst Collin Gillis from BGC Partners covering Amazon is instructive. Gillis 
was a known “bear” on Amazon.  While the mean recommendation on Amazon was 
between a “Strong Buy,” and a “Buy,” Gillis was one of less than a third of the analysts 
holding a lower recommendation.  Along with this, Gillis had a dour long term growth 
forecast, and a price target below the current price.  In addition, Gillis was one of the few 
analysts covering the firm that publicly spoke out regarding concerns around Amazon’s 
future growth prospects. For instance, Gillis published a negative research report on 
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Amazon in January 2014, and coupled this with giving a number of interviews in early 2014 
to the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, BBC, etc. making 
statements such as: “They have gotten a lot of hall passes on profitability; maybe that run 
is over”;18 and “While raising Prime pricing and pitching ‘drone delivery’ solutions make 
good headlines, shipping losses remain a burden on profits.19 
 Following these comments, in April 2013 Gillis claimed he was “locked-out” of the 
quarterly earnings call rather explicitly, as Amazon Investor Relations allegedly refused to 
give him the call-in number for the conference.  Gillis leaked this episode to the The Seattle 
Times, who documented it in: “Amazon analyst frozen out on company Q&A calls: Analyst 
skeptical about Amazon wonders why he’s not getting a chance to ask questions during the 
e-commerce giant’s quarterly conference calls.”20 Incidentally - and consistent with our 
findings across the universe of firms - at Amazon’s subsequent earnings announcement 
(July 2013), Amazon missed analysts’ expectations on EPS, missed analysts’ expectations 
on revenues, and guided downward for future earnings.21   
 We also test for the “freezing out” of analysts following negative questions more 
formally across our entire universe of earnings calls.  Ideally, we would be able to measure 
all access to management that a given analyst receives; including private visits, phone calls, 
meetings at conferences, etc.  Unfortunately, we only observe the public instances of this 
in conference calls, and so we use this as a measure of future access.  Specifically, we run a 
regression with an identical setup to our main specification, in which we include a variable 
to capture the negativity of questioning by a given analyst, and test whether this negative 
questioning has an impact on future access to management in conference calls. 
 In Appendix Table A10 we show that--generalizing the case of Colin Gillis--negative 
questioning analysts are called upon significantly less in future conference calls.  This 
evidence is consistent with Chen and Matsumoto (2006), who argue that unfavorable 
recommendations inhibit future access to management. However, we find that this pattern 
is true even controlling for the recommendation level itself, and so represents a unique 
                                                 
18 Wall Street Journal, Jan 30, 2014. 
19 The Washington Post, March 13, 2014. 
20 The Seattle Times, May 1, 2013 
21 We include other illustrations of contentious relationships between firm and analyst in Appendix Figure 
A3.  
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mechanism upon which the analysts might face negative consequences of public negativity 
regarding the firm. In terms of the magnitude of this effect, we find that doubling the 
negativity of questioning (which we measure using the ratio of (negative/positive) words 
in a question) reduces the probability of being called upon in a future call by 6% (t=3.21).  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 In this paper we document a large, global asset pricing regularity associated with 
the manner in which firms shape their information environments: through the specific 
organization and choreographing of earnings conference calls.  Our central finding is that 
firms that “cast” their conference calls - by disproportionately calling on bullish analysts 
to speak during these calls – appear to be concealing negative information that is 
systematically revealed in future asset prices and future firm operations.  Specifically, we 
show that these casting firms experience predictable negative stock returns when the hidden 
information is revealed in the future.  A long-short portfolio that goes long the non-casting 
firms and short the casting firms around their subsequent earnings calls earns abnormal 
returns ranging from 129 to 149 basis points per month, or almost 18 percent per year.    
 We demonstrate that firms with an ex-ante larger incentive to cast their calls, 
namely firms with higher discretionary accruals, firms that barely meet/exceed earnings 
expectations, and firms (and their executives) about to issue equity, sell shares, and exercise 
options, are all significantly more likely to do so.   
 We also provide out-of-sample evidence for the core findings in this paper, and show 
that the phenomenon of casting conference calls extends beyond the U.S., to an 
international sample including the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Japan.  
Collectively, our data spans 5 countries, 13 years, 4101 firms, and 7125 analysts, covering 
91,878 conference calls in total, making our dataset the largest and most extensive of any 
project analyzing corporate earnings calls.  We estimate that between 17-22% of firms in a 
given quarter engage in this type of opportunistic behavior.  However, it is not costless for 
firms to engage in casting their calls: firms who are frequent casters of their calls, see 
significant future drops in analyst coverage.  
 In sum, we provide new evidence on a channel through which firms influence 
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information disclosure even in level-playing-field information environments.  And while we 
have focused on a specific set of firm behaviors, there are likely many other ways in which 
firms seek to control information flow to the market.  Our paper suggests that exploring 
these subtle but important mechanisms through which firms manipulate their information 
environments is a promising avenue for future research. 
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 Table I: Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics of our sample. Panel A reports the key statistics of our US conference 
call sample (2003-2015), and Panel B reports the key statistics of our pooled international conference call 
sample (which includes Canada, UK, France, and Japan). #(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) is the number of sell-side analysts that have 
an opportunity to ask questions in a conference call (in-analysts), and #(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂) is the number of analysts that 
do not have the opportunity to ask questions in the conference call (out-analysts). 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the average 
recommendation level of an in-analyst in the year prior to the conference call, and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 is the average 
recommendation level of an out-analyst in the same period. 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂) is the difference 
between the average 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and average 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 for each conference call, and is our main measure of firms’ 
casting behavior. Finally, 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 is the cumulative abnormal return in the five-day window surrounding the 
quarterly earnings announcement, 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅 is the standardized earnings surprise, defined as seasonally-adjusted 
quarterly earnings growth scaled by lagged stock price, and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅 is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if a firm restates its earnings in a quarter and zero otherwise. We report in the table below the 
mean, standard deviation, 1st, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 99th percentiles of the distribution of each variable. 
 
Panel A: US Firms 
 No. Calls Mean Std Dev P1 Q1 Median Q3 P99 
Number of analysts in vs. out of each conference call 
#(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) 83,685 3.73 2.50 1 2 3 5 11 
#(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂) 83,685 6.20 5.04 1 3 5 8 24 
Analyst recommendations 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  3.75 0.77 2.00 3.04 3.79 4.25 5.00 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  3.61 0.81 1.75 3.00 3.54 4.00 5.00 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)  0.15 0.61 -1.40 -0.22 0.13 0.50 1.71 
Earnings Announcement Day Returns, Earnings Surprises 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅  0.0040 0.1023 -0.2660 -0.0437 0.0027 0.0500 0.2870 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅  -0.0032 0.1979 -0.3548 -0.0046 0.0012 0.0060 0.2691 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅  0.02 0.14 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Panel B: International Firms 
Number of analysts in vs. out of each conference call 
#(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) 5,471 4.72 3.05 1 2 4 7 13 
#(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂) 5,471 14.42 9.84 1 6 13 21 43 
Analyst recommendations 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  3.63 0.60 2.00 3.20 3.67 4.00 5.00 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  3.55 0.47 2.14 3.26 3.57 3.86 4.67 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)  0.08 0.61 -1.50 -0.31 0.08 0.43 1.61 
Earnings Announcement Day Returns 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅  0.0041 0.0713 -0.1983 -0.0299 0.0027 0.0413 0.2058 
  
 Table II: Firm Behavior on Conference Calls 
 
This table examines the likelihood of an analyst having an opportunity to ask a question in the conference 
call. The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator that takes the value of one if the analyst asks a 
question in the conference call and zero otherwise. Columns 1-4 conduct a panel OLS regression, and columns 
5 and 6 conduct a pooled logit regression. The main independent variable in columns 1-4 is the average 
recommendation of the analyst in the year prior to the conference call (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅), and that in columns 5 and 6 
is the prior-year average recommendation of the analyst relative to the consensus recommendation (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎). 
Analyst level controls include: the number of years the analyst has covered the firm (𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿), the number 
of years the analyst has been in the IBES database (𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅), the number of stocks covered by the analyst, 
the number of stocks covered by the broker (a measure of broker size), whether the analyst is an all-star 
analyst, and whether the analyst is affiliated with a broker that underwrites for the firm in question. Firm 
level controls include: lagged market capitalization, book to market ratio, past one year stock returns, monthly 
share turnover in the previous year, daily idiosyncratic volatility in the previous year, number of analysts 
covering the firm, institutional ownership, and discretionary accruals. Columns 1 and 2 include firm*quarter 
fixed effects, and columns 3 and 4 include analyst*quarter fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at both 
the firm and quarter level, are shown in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 0.057*** 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.072***   
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)   𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎     0.245*** 0.295*** 
     (0.018) (0.018) 
       𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎 ,𝑜𝑜  0.031***    0.082*** 
  (0.004)    (0.016) 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜  -0.016***    -0.044*** 
  (0.003)    (0.013) 
#𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜  -0.003    0.011 
  (0.004)    (0.018) 
#𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏  0.043***    0.202*** 
  (0.002)    (0.010) 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜  0.110***    0.325*** 
  (0.007)    (0.030) 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜  0.041***    0.245*** 
  (0.009)    (0.031) 
       
Other Controls No No No Yes No Yes 
No Obs. 832,262 832,262 832,262 832,262 832,262 832,262 
Adj-/Pseudo R2 0.025 0.054 0.362 0.366 0.005 0.025 
 
 
  
 Table III: Which Firms Call on More Favorable Analysts 
 
This table examines which firms call on more favorable analysts. Columns 1-3 relate the difference in average 
recommendation between analysts that ask questions in the conference call and those that do not to a host 
of firm characteristics, and columns 4-7 analyze whether this recommendation differential forecasts subsequent 
selling behavior of company shares. The dependent variable in the first three columns is the lagged difference 
in average prior-year recommendations between in-analysts and out-analysts (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)). The 
dependent variable in column 4 is an indicator that equals one if the firm has at least one seasoned equity 
offering in the following quarter and zero otherwise; that in column 5 is an indicator that equals one if the 
firm has positive net insider selling in the following quarter and zero otherwise; that in column 6 is an 
indicator that equals one if top executives exercise their stock options in the following quarter and zero 
otherwise; and that in column 7 is an indicator that equals one if top executives receive option grants in the 
following quarter and zero otherwise. The main independent variable in columns 4-7 is lagged 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) −𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂). Other independent variables include: a dummy (𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅0)that equals one if the firm has a zero or 
one cent earnings surprise and zero otherwise, discretionary accruals, analyst forecast dispersion and 
recommendation dispersion, institutional ownership, the number of analysts covering the firm, and 
idiosyncratic volatility. Other control variables include: lagged market capitalization, book to market ratio, 
past one year stock returns, average stock recommendation, and past one year monthly share turnover. 
Columns 1-3 conduct a pooled OLS regression with both firm and quarter fixed effects. Columns 4-7 conduct 
a logit regression. Standard errors, clustered at both the firm and quarter level, are shown in parenthesis. *, 
**, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜 − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜+1 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜+1 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜+1 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜+1 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜 −     0.076** 0.044** 0.032* -0.045** 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜    (0.036) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) 
        𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅0𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜 0.030** 0.027** 0.027** 0.010 -0.114*** -0.117*** -0.029 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.100) (0.043) (0.042) (0.048) 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜 0.139** 0.104* 0.100* 2.208*** 0.425* 0.293 -0.576** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.349) (0.243) (0.273) (0.273) 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜  -0.014 -0.002 0.155 -0.349*** -0.495*** -0.049 
  (0.040) (0.033) (0.276) (0.114) (0.127) -0.031 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜  0.194*** 0.192*** -0.053 0.023 0.043 0.348*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.097) (0.060) (0.071) (0.073) 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜  -0.004 -0.004 -0.488*** 0.421*** 0.315*** 0.670*** 
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.133) (0.086) (0.077) (0.111) 
#𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.019** 0.005 -0.002 -0.020*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜  0.323 0.353 0.345*** -0.165*** -0.245*** 0.033 
  (0.492) (0.493) (0.584) (0.044) (0.040) (0.049) 
        
Other Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No Obs. 66,357 66,357 66,357 66,357 66,357 66,357 66,357 
Adj-/Pseudo R2 0.101 0.128 0.129 0.103 0.081 0.075 0.039 
  
 Table IV: Distribution of RECD(IN)-RECD(OUT) by Year 
 
Our data runs from 2003 through the first quarter of 2015.  Panel A reports the mean, standard deviation, 
1st, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 99th percentiles of the distribution of 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)  by year. Panel B 
reports the fraction of 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂) greater than a certain threshold in each year.  
 
Panel A: Distribution of 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)  by Year 
Year No. Obs Mean StdDev 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% 
2003 3,579 0.123 0.553 -1.389 -0.215 0.123 0.462 1.497 
2004 4,984 0.186 0.617 -1.322 -0.189 0.158 0.545 1.842 
2005 6,022 0.165 0.640 -1.458 -0.217 0.151 0.542 1.817 
2006 6,757 0.163 0.639 -1.393 -0.215 0.138 0.521 1.883 
2007 7,307 0.147 0.631 -1.500 -0.225 0.105 0.521 1.750 
2008 7,799 0.169 0.613 -1.396 -0.196 0.142 0.535 1.741 
2009 8,047 0.134 0.603 -1.361 -0.239 0.110 0.500 1.659 
2010 7,879 0.134 0.599 -1.399 -0.228 0.119 0.499 1.658 
2011 7,675 0.143 0.603 -1.405 -0.223 0.131 0.500 1.667 
2012 7,702 0.148 0.592 -1.361 -0.202 0.137 0.484 1.741 
2013 7,418 0.135 0.581 -1.306 -0.211 0.125 0.477 1.625 
2014 7,201 0.124 0.583 -1.393 -0.211 0.122 0.458 1.633 
2015 1,315 0.128 0.609 -1.542 -0.232 0.155 0.493 1.637 
2003-2015 83,685 0.147 0.606 -1.400 -0.215 0.129 0.500 1.708 
 
Panel B: Fraction of 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂) Greater Than Some Threshold 
Year No. Obs % > 0 % > 0.2 % > 0.4 % > 0.6 % > 0.8 % > 1 
2003 3,579 59.49% 44.12% 29.53% 17.71% 10.31% 4.89% 
2004 4,984 62.70% 46.77% 33.37% 22.45% 14.55% 8.61% 
2005 6,022 60.48% 46.28% 32.90% 22.39% 14.25% 8.75% 
2006 6,757 59.94% 45.43% 31.57% 21.86% 14.33% 8.97% 
2007 7,307 57.73% 43.93% 31.30% 21.54% 14.07% 8.47% 
2008 7,799 60.61% 46.02% 32.71% 21.84% 14.07% 8.27% 
2009 8,047 58.05% 43.53% 30.87% 20.12% 12.84% 7.41% 
2010 7,879 59.32% 44.36% 30.65% 19.51% 11.84% 7.21% 
2011 7,675 59.70% 45.17% 31.02% 20.22% 12.83% 7.48% 
2012 7,702 60.17% 45.17% 31.06% 18.54% 11.82% 7.02% 
2013 7,418 59.57% 43.83% 29.63% 19.20% 11.26% 6.44% 
2014 7,201 58.98% 43.80% 28.50% 17.83% 11.14% 5.97% 
2015 1,315 59.24% 46.08% 31.56% 18.40% 11.48% 6.24% 
2003-2015 83,685 59.63% 44.84% 31.08% 20.24% 12.78% 7.49% 
 
  
 Table V: Future Earnings Announcement Returns and Earnings Surprises  
 
Panel A reports forecasting regressions of earnings announcement day returns and earnings surprises on 
lagged differences in average recommendations between analysts that ask questions in the conference call and 
those that do not. The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the cumulative abnormal return in the five-day 
window around the earnings announcement (𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅, in %) and that in columns 4-6 is the standardized 
unexpected earnings, defined as seasonally adjusted quarterly earnings growth scaled by lagged stock price 
(𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅, in %). Both dependent variables are measured in the subsequent quarter. The main independent 
variable across all columns is the lagged difference in average prior-year recommendations between in-analysts 
and out-analysts (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)). We also include in the regression lagged analyst forecast 
dispersion, analyst recommendation dispersion, institutional ownership, number of analysts covering the firm, 
an 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂 dummy that equals one if the firm has at least one seasoned equity offering in the current quarter 
and zero otherwise, an 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 dummy that equals one if the firm has net insider selling in the current 
quarter and zero otherwise, an 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 dummy that equals one if top executives exercise their stock options 
in the current quarter and zero otherwise. Other control variables include: lagged market capitalization, book 
to market ratio, past one year stock returns, monthly share turnover, idiosyncratic volatility, average stock 
recommendation, and discretionary accruals. Panel B reports the results of similar forecasting regressions, 
where we also include a 𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 dummy (which takes the value of one if there is no more question in 
the queue at the end of the conference call and zero otherwise), as well as its interaction with 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) −𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂). In both panels, we conduct Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted standard 
errors of four lags. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Forecasting Future Announcement Returns and Earnings Surprises 
 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜+1 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜+1 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜+1 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜+1 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜+1 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜+1 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜 − -0.244*** -0.190*** -0.259*** -0.370** -0.268** -0.269** 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜 (0.081) (0.073) (0.098) (0.158) (0.136) (0.139) 
       𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜  0.256 0.117  -0.484 -0.371 
  (0.612) (0.390)  (1.328) (1.274) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜  -0.290 -0.290  -0.340 -0.750* 
  (0.215) (0.228)  (0.415) (0.428) 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜  0.470*** 0.481***  -0.174 -0.269 
  (0.129) (0.111)  (0.388) (0.566) 
#𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜  0.026 0.200  0.243 -0.463*** 
  (0.100) (0.140)  (0.295) (0.162) 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜   -0.585   0.899 
   (0.263)   (0.930) 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜   -0.075   0.147 
   (0.179)   (0.174) 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜   0.199   0.223** 
   (0.133)   (0.090) 
       
Other Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
No Quarters 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Adj-R2 0.003 0.014 0.050 0.020 0.120 0.158 
 
  
 Table V (ctd.): Future Earnings Surprises and Earnings Announcement Returns 
 
 
Panel B: Interaction with the 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 Dummy 
 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜+1 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜+1 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜+1 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜+1 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜+1 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜+1 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜 − -0.359*** -0.270*** -0.347*** -0.652*** -0.556** -0.620*** 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜 (0.105) (0.094) (0.108) (0.234) (0.227) (0.252) 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜 0.235** 0.198* 0.220** 0.638** 0.663** 0.796** 
 (0.105) (0.104) (0.105) (0.242) (0.325) (0.352) 𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜 -0.221 -0.249 -0.265 0.365 0.370 0.489 
 (0.154) (0.183) (0.161) (0.357) (0.401) (0.305) 
       𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜  0.306 0.164  -0.488 -0.374 
  (0.672) (0.442)  (1.328) (1.274) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜  -0.241 -0.216  -0.333 -0.739* 
  (0.183) (0.174)  (0.414) (0.425) 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜  0.484*** 0.464***  -0.177 -0.260 
  (0.118) (0.116)  (0.391) (0.564) 
#𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜  -0.051 0.119  0.313 -0.420*** 
  (0.122) (0.129)  (0.349) (0.162) 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜   -0.583**   0.887 
   (0.270)   (0.927) 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜   -0.038   0.154 
   (0.149)   (0.178) 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜   0.182   0.213** 
   (0.119)   (0.092) 
       
Other Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
No Quarters 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Adj-R2 0.009 0.022 0.055 0.022 0.122 0.160 
 
  
 Table VI: Future Earnings Announcement Returns to Extreme Casting 
 
This table reports forecasting regressions of earnings announcement day returns on lagged differences in 
average recommendations between analysts that ask questions in the conference call and those that do not. 
The dependent variable in all columns is the cumulative abnormal return in the five day window around the 
subsequent earnings announcement (𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅, in %). The main independent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy 
that equals one if 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂) is greater than the 75th percentile of its distribution in each 
quarter; the main independent variable in columns 4-6 is a dummy that equals one if 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) −𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂) is greater than the 90th percentile of its distribution in each quarter. We include in the regressions 
the same set of control variables as in Table V. Columns 1 and 4 report the baseline result. Columns 2, 3, 5 
and 6 further include a 𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 dummy (which takes the value of one if there is no more question in 
the queue at the end of the conference call and zero otherwise), as well as its interaction with the indicator 
based on 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂). In each column, we conduct a Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-
West adjusted standard errors of four lags. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜+1 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜+1 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜+1 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜+1 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜+1 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜+1 
 CASTING > 75% CASTING > 90% 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜 − -0.219** -0.291** -0.327** -0.300** -0.487*** -0.430*** 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜 (0.094) (0.133) (0.151) (0.120) (0.161) (0.155) 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜  0.155** 0.187**  0.510*** 0.435** 
  (0.077) (0.079)  (0.175) (0.196) 𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜  -0.230 -0.291*  -0.237 -0.283* 
  (0.162) (0.173)  (0.158) (0.159) 
       𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜   0.158   0.327 
   (0.431)   (0.590) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜   -0.222   -0.274 
   (0.187)   (0.220) 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜   0.473***   0.444*** 
   (0.112)   (0.118) 
#𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜   0.113   0.094 
   (0.133)   (0.137) 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜   -0.572**   -0.589** 
   (0.266)   (0.269) 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜   -0.047   -0.041 
   (0.156)   (0.147) 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜   0.200   0.174 
   (0.131)   (0.113) 
       
Other Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
F-M # Qtrs 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Adj-R2 0.003 0.009 0.056 0.003 0.008 0.055 
 
  
 Table VII: Portfolio Approach 
 
This table reports monthly returns to a calendar-time portfolio that exploits the return predictability of 
recommendation differentials between analysts that ask questions in the conference call and those that do 
not. Specifically, on each day, we rank all firms into five quintiles based on the recommendation differential 
between in-analysts and out-analysts in the previous quarter. Next, in the five days surrounding the following 
quarterly earnings announcement, we go long stocks whose 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)-𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂) in the previous quarter is 
in the top quintile, and short stocks whose 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)-𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂) in the previous quarter is in the bottom 
quintile. If on any given day, there are fewer than 5 stocks in either the long or short lag, we hold the 30-day 
Treasury bill instead (this is the case for less than 10% of the trading days). We then aggregate these daily 
returns to the monthly level. Panel A reports the monthly returns to the five quintile portfolios after adjusting 
for various risk factors; and Panel B reports the risk exposures of these five portfolios. In the full specification, 
we control for the Carhart four factors (including momentum) and the liquidity factor. T-statistics, with 
Newey-West adjustments of four lags, are shown in brackets. L-S estimates significant at the 5% level are 
indicated in bold. 
 
Panel A: Portfolio Returns 
Quintile 
Excess 
Returns 
1-Factor 
Alpha 
3-Factor 
Alpha 
4-Factor 
Alpha 
5-Factor 
Alpha 
1 1.46% 1.08% 1.07% 1.07% 1.03% 
 [2.59] [1.80] [1.88] [1.85] [1.62] 
2 1.26% 0.91% 0.86% 0.90% 0.90% 
 [2.55] [1.65] [1.65] [1.72] [1.54] 
3 0.96% 0.39% 0.35% 0.36% 0.37% 
 [1.87] [0.85] [0.77] [0.80] [0.76] 
4 0.48% -0.13% -0.19% -0.20% -0.30% 
 [0.75] [-0.20] [-0.31] [-0.32] [-0.46] 
5 0.18% -0.43% -0.39% -0.38% -0.44% 
 [0.30] [-0.69] [-0.65] [-0.63] [-0.66] 
5-1 -1.29% -1.53% -1.48% -1.47% -1.49% 
 [-2.59] [-2.86] [-2.78] [-2.78] [-2.64] 
 
 
Panel B: Factor Loadings 
 XRet Alpha MKT SMB HML UMD LIQ 
1 1.46% 1.03% 0.175 0.742 0.448 0.014 0.078 
 [2.59] [1.62] [0.87] [2.77] [2.01] [0.13] [0.48] 
5 0.18% -0.44% 0.468 0.324 0.556 -0.055 0.119 
 [0.30] [-0.66] [2.13] [1.30] [2.17] [-0.54] [0.64] 
5-1 -1.29% -1.49% 0.304 -0.403 0.128 -0.066 0.049 
 [-2.59] [-2.64] [1.77] [-1.78] [0.43] [-0.67] [0.37] 
 
  
 Table VIII: Portfolio Approach – Monthly Rebalancing 
 
This table reports monthly returns to a calendar-time portfolio that exploits the return predictability of 
recommendation differentials between analysts that ask questions in the conference call and those that do 
not. Importantly, instead of using the actual reporting month, we follow Frazzini and Lamont (2006) to 
compute expected earnings announcement month, with the assumption that firms report in the same calendar 
month as four fiscal quarters ago. Specifically, in each month, we rank all firms into five quintiles based on 
the recommendation differential between in analysts and out analysts in the previous quarter. Next, in the 
subsequent expected earnings announcement month, we go long stocks whose 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)-𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂) in the 
previous quarter is in the top quintile, and short stocks whose 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)-𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂) in the previous quarter 
is in the bottom quintile. Panel A reports the monthly returns to the five quintile portfolios after adjusting 
for various risk factors; Panel B reports the risk exposures of these five portfolios. In the full specification, we 
control for the Carhart four factors (including momentum) and the liquidity factor. T-statistics, with Newey-
West adjustments of four lags, are shown in brackets. L-S estimates significant at the 5% level are indicated 
in bold. 
 
Panel A: Portfolio Returns 
Quintile 
Excess 
Returns 
1-Factor 
Alpha 
3-Factor 
Alpha 
4-Factor 
Alpha 
5-Factor 
Alpha 
1 1.66% 0.67% 0.60% 0.65% 0.66% 
 [2.93] [2.46] [2.75] [3.09] [3.15] 
2 1.16% 0.09% 0.05% 0.08% 0.09% 
 [1.97] [0.33] [0.18] [0.32] [0.34] 
3 1.26% 0.24% 0.18% 0.22% 0.24% 
 [2.27] [1.02] [0.97] [1.19] [1.27] 
4 1.46% 0.41% 0.35% 0.40% 0.42% 
 [2.53] [1.61] [1.68] [1.98] [2.03] 
5 0.99% -0.12% -0.17% -0.11% -0.12% 
 [1.63] [-0.46] [-0.75] [-0.54] [-0.52] 
5-1 -0.67% -0.79% -0.77% -0.76% -0.78% 
 [-1.97] [-2.50] [-2.51] [-2.45] [-2.45] 
 
 
Panel B: Factor Loadings 
 XRet Alpha MKT SMB HML UMD LIQ 
1 1.66% 0.66% 0.973 0.880 0.253 -0.205 -0.035 
 [2.93] [3.15] [16.62] [7.69] [2.31] [-3.65] [-0.81] 
5 0.99% -0.12% 1.202 0.721 -0.001 -0.241 0.007 
 [1.63] [-0.52] [21.25] [6.23] [-0.01] [-4.12] [0.10] 
5-1 -0.67% -0.78% 0.228 -0.159 -0.254 -0.037 0.042 
 [-1.97] [-2.45] [2.52] [-0.92] [-1.59] [-0.42] [0.50] 
 
  
 Table IX: Future Earnings Restatements 
 
This table reports logit regressions of earnings restatements on the lagged difference in average 
recommendations between analysts that ask questions in the conference call and those that do not. The 
dependent variable in all columns is a 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅 dummy that equals one if the firm restates its earnings in 
the following year and zero otherwise. The main independent variable is the lagged difference in average 
prior-year recommendations between in-analysts and out-analysts (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)). We also 
include in the regression lagged analyst forecast dispersion, analyst recommendation dispersion, institutional 
ownership, number of analysts covering the firm, an 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂 dummy that equals one if the firm has at least one 
seasoned equity offering in the current quarter and zero otherwise, an 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 dummy that equals one if 
the firm has net insider selling in the current quarter and zero otherwise, an 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 dummy that equals 
one if top executives exercise their stock options in the current quarter and zero otherwise. Other control 
variables include: lagged market capitalization, book to market ratio, past one year stock returns, monthly 
share turnover, idiosyncratic volatility, average stock recommendation, and discretionary accruals. In each 
column, we conduct a pooled logit regression. Columns 1-3 report the baseline results. Columns 4-6 further 
include a 𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 dummy (which takes the value of one if there is no more question in the queue at 
the end of the conference call and zero otherwise), as well as its interaction with 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂). 
Standard errors, clustered at the quarterly level, are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜+1 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜 − 0.067** 0.057** 0.056* 0.137*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜 (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜    -0.176*** -0.166*** -0.165*** 
    (0.062) (0.060) (0.060) 𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜    0.056 -0.007 -0.008 
    (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) 
       𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜  -0.069 -0.098  -0.072 -0.102 
  (1.811) (1.785)  (1.815) (1.791) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜  -0.018 -0.021  -0.017 -0.020 
  (0.102) (0.102)  (0.102) (0.102) 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜  0.005 0.010  0.004 0.009 
  (0.091) (0.091)  (0.091) (0.091) 
#𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜  -0.146*** -0.145***  -0.150*** -0.149*** 
  (0.033) (0.034)  (0.033) (0.034) 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜   0.243**   0.241** 
   (0.097)   (0.097) 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜   0.059   0.059 
   (0.050)   (0.050) 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜   -0.081*   -0.081* 
   (0.049)   (0.049) 
       
Other Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
No Obs. 53,409 53,409 53,409 53,409 53,409 53,409 
Pseudo-R2 0.002 0.020 0.024 0.006 0.023 0.027 
 Table X: Firm Behavior on Conference Calls (Global) 
 
This table examines the likelihood of an analyst having an opportunity to ask a question in a conference call 
in the international setting. Our sample includes conference calls in four foreign countries: Canada (columns 
1-2), UK (columns 3-4), France (columns 5-6), and Japan (columns 7-8). The dependent variable in all 
columns is an indicator that takes the value of one if the analyst asks a question in the conference call and 
zero otherwise. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 conduct a panel OLS regression, where the main independent variable 
is the average recommendation level of the analyst in the year prior to the conference call (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅). Columns 
2, 4, 6, and 8 conduct a pooled logit regression, where the main independent variable is the prior-year average 
recommendation level of the analyst relative to the firm’s consensus recommendation (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎). Other 
control variables include: the number of years the analyst has covered the firm (𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿), the number of 
years the analyst has been in the IBES database (𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅), the number of stocks covered by the analyst, 
the number of stocks covered by the broker (a measure of broker size). Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 also include 
firm*quarter fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at both the firm and quarter level, are shown in 
parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 Canada UK France Japan 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 0.023***  0.017***  0.011***  0.024**  
 (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.012)  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  0.102***  0.115***  0.097***  0.160** 
  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.029)  (0.079) 
         𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎 ,𝑜𝑜 -0.015 -0.108* 0.027*** 0.120*** 0.009 0.069 0.067*** 0.485*** 
 (0.012) (0.063) (0.007) (0.036) (0.007) (0.050) (0.013) (0.095) 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 -0.007 0.007 0.021*** 0.146*** 0.030*** 0.241*** 0.054*** 0.399** 
 (0.010) (0.046) (0.005) (0.036) (0.009) (0.075) (0.020) (0.172) 
#𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜 0.033*** 0.046 -0.017*** -0.038 -0.008 -0.011 -0.053*** -0.374*** 
 (0.008) (0.039) (0.006) (0.038) (0.007) (0.047) (0.010) (0.125) 
#𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 0.027*** 0.079*** 0.057*** 0.393*** 0.059*** 0.542*** 0.011 0.124 
 (0.006) (0.024) (0.004) (0.030) (0.007) (0.056) (0.014) (0.104) 
         
No Obs. 49,159 49,159 39,934 39,934 25,302 25,302 9,497 9,497 
Adj-/Pseudo R2 0.120 0.003 0.053 0.031 0.062 0.047 0.080 0.061 
 Table XI: Future Announcement Day Returns (Global) 
 
This table reports forecasting regressions of earnings announcement day returns on lagged differences in 
average recommendations between analysts that ask questions in the conference call and those that do not 
in the international setting. Our sample includes conference calls in four foreign countries: Canada (column 
1), UK (column 2), France (column 3), and Japan (column 4). In column 5, we pool all observations from 
the four countries together. The dependent variable in each column is the cumulative abnormal return in the 
five day window around the next earnings announcement (𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅, in %). The main independent variable is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the prior-year average lagged recommendation level of in-analysts is greater 
than that of out-analysts (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) >  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)), and zero otherwise. We also include in the regression 
lagged analyst forecast dispersion, analyst recommendation dispersion, and the number of analysts covering 
the firm. In each column, we conduct a Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted standard errors 
of four lags. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜+1 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜+1 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜+1 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜+1 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜+1 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 Canada UK France Japan All 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜 > -0.594*** -0.862*** -0.791** -0.994* -0.530*** 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜 (0.188) (0.284) (0.387) (0.571) (0.165) 
      𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜 -0.903 0.991 5.966 0.954 0.264 
 (0.615) (0.672) (5.373) (1.249) (0.504) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜 0.000 0.012 -0.029 0.094** 0.011** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.020) (0.039) (0.005) 
#𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 ,𝑜𝑜 -0.028 -0.039* -0.093 -0.107 -0.071** 
 (0.041) (0.022) (0.116) (0.359) (0.034) 
      
No. Qtrs. 44 28 34 27 44 
Adj-R2 0.100 0.152 0.372 0.483 0.074 
 
 
  
 Table XII: Order of Questions 
 
This table examines the order of the questions asked. The dependent variable in all columns is the order of 
analysts asking questions (e.g., the first questioner would have a value of one). The main independent 
variables include: the average recommendation level of the analyst in the year prior to the conference call 
(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅), whether the analyst is an all-star analyst (𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅), whether the analyst is affiliated with a broker 
that underwrites for the firm in question (𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅), and the number of All-Star analysts employed by the 
broker (𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅), which is a common measure of broker prestige. We also interact the analyst’s 
recommendation with these status variables. Other analyst-level controls include: the number of years the 
analyst has covered the firm (𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿), the number of years the analyst has been in the IBES database 
(𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅), the number of stocks covered by the analyst, the number of stocks covered by the broker. In each 
column, we conduct a pooled OLS with firm*quarter fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at both the firm 
and quarter level, are shown in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜  𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜  𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜  𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 -0.167*** -0.193*** -0.209*** -0.219*** -0.172*** -0.185*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜   -0.706*** -0.630*** -0.334*** -0.281*** 
   (0.040) (0.040) (0.115) (0.118) 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅     -0.103*** -0.097*** 
     (0.033) (0.034) 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜   -0.365*** -0.307*** 0.290 0.361 
   (0.065) (0.064) (0.301) (0.298) 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅     -0.169** -0.172** 
     (0.073) (0.072) 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜   -0.225*** -0.150*** 0.154 0.175 
   (0.043) (0.041) (0.161) (0.160) 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎,𝑜𝑜 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅     -0.106** -0.091** 
     (0.045) (0.045) 
       
Other Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
No. Obs. 313,179 313,179 313,179 313,179 313,179 313,179 
Adj-R2 0.142 0.147 0.150 0.152 0.150 0.152 
 
 
  
 Figure 1: Sealed Air Corporation Q1 2007 Conference Call 
 
This figure gives excerpts from Sealed Air Corporation’s Q1 2007 earnings conference call, which occurred 
on April 25, 2007. 
 
Panel A: Joking and complimenting cash usage 
 
 
Panel B: Familiarity and analyst pointing out successful strategy (with no real question)
 
 
  
Panel C: More complimenting 
 
 
 
 
  
 Figure 2: Histogram of the Distribution of Casting Episode Length 
 
This figure shows the number of quarters that each casting episode lasts in our sample—i.e., situations where 
a firm calls on ex-ante more favorable analysts in the earnings call (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)). So, for 
instance, about 38% of the cases of casting by firms are for a single quarter. 
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